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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are the owner of a large pharmaceutical company in the United 
States.  You have spent enormous amounts of money and time in developing a new 
and useful drug. Patent ownership provides protection for your business so that as 
your company grows, you have more money to invest in research and development 
of new drugs.  To your surprise, you find that you are slowly losing control of your 
patent because you are being forced by foreign governments to allow others to use 
                                                          
1 J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A. James Madison University.  
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your patented products without your consent.  As a result, profits are diminished 
and control of your product weakened.  This is an example of what results when 
governments abusively issue compulsory licenses.  Regardless of how one thinks 
healthcare within the United States should be provided for, in the area of 
healthcare innovation, the United States has contributed more than any other 
country.2  Because of this fact, the United States healthcare industry stands to be 
disproportionately burdened unless changes are made to international compulsory 
licensing procedures and investors start critically analyzing the policies of the 
countries where they choose to invest. 
A compulsory license is a controversial legal instrument, which provides a 
unique exception to copyright law.  Essentially, a compulsory license is an 
involuntary contract between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller, which is 
enforced by a state government.3  Generally under a compulsory license, 
authorization is given to a manufacturer to produce a patented product without the 
patent-holder’s permission.4  This severe limitation on the rights of patent holders 
has increasingly been used in the health care arena by countries wishing to produce 
pharmaceuticals at a reduced cost in the name of public health.5  With the addition 
of an amendment (“Article 31bis”) to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
framework,6 developed countries are now allowed to grant compulsory licenses to 
domestic manufacturers who can then export pharmaceuticals to developing 
countries – one of the main problems that patent systems are designed to protect 
against.7  While compulsory licenses may be needed in dire situations, there is a 
risk that vague language within compulsory licensing law will allow the system to 
be misused and abused.  Ultimately, the United States pharmaceutical industry will 
absorb the greatest burden. 
With that in mind, this note will examine why the international compulsory 
                                                          
2 JOSEPH DIMASI, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG INNOVATION: THIRTY-FIVE SUMMARY CASE 
HISTORIES ON PRIVATE SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCE (2008), available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/mpr_06.htm (noting that from 1982-2003 American drug 
makers produced a greater number of first-in-class drugs than European producers, despite Europe’s 
larger population).  
3 See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and The Reality, 
PTC Research Foundation of the Franklin Pierce Law Center, IDEA: J.L. & TECH. (1993); Carlos M. 
Correa, Bilateral Investment Agreements: Agents of New Global Standards for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights? (Aug. 2004), http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=186 (“A compulsory 
license is an authorization given by the government for the use by a third party, without consent of the 
right holder, of a patent or other intellectual property rights”); Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The 
Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 
AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 283 n.1 (2008) (“The term ‘compulsory license’ can refer to any compelled 
relaxation of an intellectual property owner’s right to exclude in exchange for a licensee’s payment”). 
4 See Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42 GA. L. REV. 
131, 133 (2008). 
5 See Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: 
Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331 (2004). 
6 See Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 73 (2004) (the November 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health was adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001 in Doha on November 14, 
2001.  It reaffirmed flexibility of TRIPS member states in circumventing patent rights for better access 
to essential medicines.). 
7 See id. 
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licensing failures will disproportionately effect the United States pharmaceutical 
industry in the future, why more comprehensive and defined guidelines for 
implementation are needed, and how pharmaceutical companies can protect 
themselves using bilateral investment treaties.  To this end, Section I provides a 
general description of intellectual property rights as they currently exist 
worldwide.  Next, Section II provides an overview of the WTO compulsory 
licensing scheme and its amendment, Article 31bis.  Section III explores the 
implications specific to American pharmaceutical companies.  Against this 
backdrop, Section IV outlines the recent uses of compulsory licenses that have 
been harmful to pharmaceutical businesses in the United States, and how Article 
31bis’s application could be abused.  Finally, Section V will provide general policy 
suggestions for making amendments that will allow for increased protection of 
patent rights, and how bilateral investment treaties can be used as an alternative 
means of settling disputes for American companies investing abroad. 
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF COMPULSORY LICENSES 
A.  The Modern Patent System 
While organized patent systems are relatively modern developments, the 
basic rights trace back hundreds of years and were first recognized in 15th century 
Venice as an essential innovation in property law.8  Today, the patent system in the 
United States is given effect by the Constitution.9  Article I, Section 8, authorizes 
Congress to grant exclusive rights to authors and inventors for their respective 
discoveries for a limited time.10  A patent in the United States, grants the patent 
holder a twenty-year monopolistic right over his invention, during which time no 
one, absent authorization by the patent holder, may make, use, or sell the patented 
product.11  In exchange for this exclusive right, the patent holder pays his due to 
society by disclosing the technical specifications relating to how the invention was 
created, and at the end of the twenty-year period, the protection expires allowing 
the patented invention to enter the public domain for open production and non-
exclusive use.12 
Outside of the United States, many countries have similar patent protections, 
the enforcement of which is governed by national laws and international treaties.13  
Most businesses from the United States making investments in foreign countries 
rely on national patent laws, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), and other 
international investment agreements, including the WTO, to protect private 
investments.14  Most BITs provide a comprehensive listing of the types of 
                                                          
8 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 118 
(4th ed. 2007). 
9 See id. 
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
11 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 118. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 Id. 
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protected intellectual property as well as detailed arbitration clauses.15  However, 
the extent to which rights guaranteed through BITs are actually enforced and 
protected is unclear as there has yet to be a publicly reported decision concerning 
an intellectual property right protected within a BIT.16  Nonetheless, as foreign 
investments and the number of treaties increase, future arbitration in this area is 
inevitable.17  In our increasingly globalized world, intellectual property, especially 
in the realm of pharmaceuticals, has become a huge business.18  Indeed, it has been 
suggested that international patent rights “have never been more economically and 
politically important . . . than they are today.”19  
In the area of foreign direct investment intellectual property rights empower 
pharmaceutical companies with the legal protection required to stay profitable in 
foreign markets.20  The exclusivity provided by the patent is unique in its ability to 
protect foreign investors from illegal copying, and is therefore essential for 
pharmaceutical companies investing abroad.21  One commentator observed that for 
a single drug to enter the market, an average of one billion dollars is spent first in 
research and development.22  The cost of production, distribution, and marketing 
of a drug usually pales in comparison to this front-end investment making the 
pharmaceutical industry particularly vulnerable to patent infringement and 
compulsory licensing.23  Having the ability to leverage a product through patent 
protection is essential for pharmaceutical companies who rely primarily on 
innovative research and development to stay competitive.24   
                                                          
15 In most BITs, the term “investment,” incorporates almost any kind of business related activity.  
See Mahnaz Malik, Recent Developments in the Definition of Investment in International Investment 
Agreements, available at www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/dci_recent_dev.pdf. 
16 Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5, at 352; Tsai-Yu Lin, Compulsory Licenses for 
Access to Medicines, Expropriation and Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment 
Agreements – Are There Issues Beyond the TRIPS Agreement?, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 152 (2009) (noting that to date “no claim regarding compulsory licenses has been 
brought before investor-state arbitration and led to an arbitral award”). 
17 Id. 
18 See Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5, at 333. 
19 FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS IN LIGHT OF U.S. FEDERAL LAW, Issue Paper No. 12 (Feb. 2006). 
20 See Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: ‘Adequate Remuneration’ for Non-Voluntary Patent 
Licensing, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 937 (2008). 
21 Christopher S. Gibson, Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: Balancing Concerns 
of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Standards, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1403, 
1428 (2007) (explaining the importance of patent protection for businesses whose primary product is 
rooted in intellectual property). 
22 Ronald A. Cass, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Exception that Ate the 
Rule? 16-17 (D.C. Legal Found., Working Paper Series No. 150, 2007), available at http://www. 
wlf.org/upload/casswpCover.pdf. 
23 See id.; Richard J. Hunter, Compulsory Licensing: A Major Issue in International Business 
Today?, 11 EUR. J. SOC. SCI. 370 (2009) (noting that because of the increasing complexity of the 
chronic and degenerative diseases that have become the main targets of pharmaceutical research and 
development, it now takes an average of ten to fifteen years to bring a new drug from the laboratory to 
market, at a cost of more than $500 million); see also Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an 
Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. ___ (forthcoming 
Fall 2010) (explaining that “[t]he pharmaceutical industry is [a] prototypical patent-sensitive industry”). 
24 See Hunter, supra note, 23 at 371. 
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B.  Compulsory Licenses 
A compulsory license provides a government with the authority to exercise 
one or more of the exclusive rights without having to obtain the patent holder’s 
permission to do so.25  The use of compulsory licensing has been recognized 
internationally for more than 125 years, however in recent years there has been a 
distinct expansion in scope.26  The Paris Convention, dating from 1883,27 first 
recognized compulsory licensing as a means to address the abusive exercise of 
patent rights on “failure to work” grounds, thereby justifying issuance in limited 
cases.28  Through a compulsory license, a government authority interferes directly 
with a privately owned patent to authorize its use by the government or by one or 
more third parties, subject to certain terms.29  For example, a compulsory license 
might be issued by a government agency with conditions, such as removing 
restrictions on the use for which the license is authorized, specifying which third 
parties are entitled to use the patent, imposing time restrictions on the use, and 
                                                          
25 See Cahoy, supra note 4, at 133. 
26 ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES 274 
(University of Chicago Press 1st ed. 2009) (noting that while the idea of compulsory licensing “seems 
to have originated as a serious proposition in the 1830s . . . [its] predecessors can be traced back into the 
eighteenth century”). 
27 MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 120; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
art. 5(A), Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538 provides that:   
(1) Importation by the patentee into the country where the patent has been 
granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the Union shall not 
entail forfeiture of the patent. 
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might 
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for 
example, failure to work.  
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the 
grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the said 
abuses.  No proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be 
instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant of the first 
compulsory license.  
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work 
or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the 
date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the grant of 
the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee 
justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be 
non–exclusive and shall not be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a 
sub–license, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits 
such license.   
Id. 
28 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5(A), Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 
1538.  The Paris Convention originally sought to prevent the patentee from denying public access to 
novel intellectual property, where to withhold such information would be unreasonable or contrary to 
public policy.  Id.  Under Article 5 of the Paris Convention, an applicant could apply for a 
nonexclusive, nontransferable compulsory license for the use of an invention in the public interest on 
the grounds of “failure to work” or “insufficient working” before the expiration of three years from the 
date of application for the patent, or four years from the date of the grant of the patent whichever period 
expires last.  Id.  However, the Paris Convention allowed a compulsory license application to be denied 
if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.  Id. 
29 Cahoy, supra note 4, at 133. 
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specifying payment of compensation to the IP owner.30  The purpose of a 
compulsory license, in the pharmaceutical context, is presumably to increase 
access to essential medicines by providing a broader use of the invention than 
intended by the original patent holder.31  As a result however, the patent holder is 
forced to give up a large amount of control of the patent for the alleged benefit of 
the larger public.32 
Despite the centrality of exclusive rights within the intellectual property 
system, the compulsory license claims to provide a safety valve for occasions 
where there is an overriding public interest.33  The compulsory license thus enables 
a government to make an exception to the exclusive protection by allowing usage 
of the patent for itself or a third party on certain conditions it deems appropriate.34  
Given the powerful nature of compulsory licenses, it is easy to see that if misused, 
there is a potential threat to the security of private property, as well as 
innovation.35  In this regard, a compulsory license can be compared to a 
governmental taking of real property by use of eminent domain power as seen in 
the United States Supreme Court decision Kelo v. City of New London.36  Like a 
governmental taking, a compulsory license can considerably erode the confidence 
in private property and protected innovations.37 
The use of a compulsory license often triggers WTO trade law 
considerations.  Most of the scholarly commentary concerning the use of 
compulsory licensing has focused on international trade laws and public health 
issues.38  The most relevant commentary is focused on the WTO’s Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (“TRIPS Agreement”), which sets 
conditions for the issuance of a compulsory license in Article 31.39  Additionally, 
                                                          
30 See Taubman, supra note 20, at 947. 
31 Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5, at 331. 
32 Cahoy, supra note 4, at 141-42. 
33 See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to 
Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389 (2002). 
34 See id. 
35 See Gibson, supra note 21, at 1-3 (an expansion of interference by a government polity through 
compulsory licensing has the potential to substantially diminish security in intellectual property rights). 
36 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  In Kelo, the Supreme Court ruled that state 
and local governments should be given broad deference in deciding to take private property to use for 
private economic development projects.  Id. 
37 Cass, supra note 22, at 2 (comparing the government interference in private property to the 
effects of indirect expropriation through the use of a compulsory license and noting that “the security of 
private property is substantially reduced if government can take it by force for any and every use the 
authorities want”). 
38 See, e.g., Sandra Bartelt, Compulsory Licenses Pursuant to TRIPS Article 31 in the Light of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 6 J. WORLD INT’L PROP. 283 (2003); 
KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM SWEDISH NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, THE WTO DECISION ON COMPULSORY 
LICENSING: DOES IT ENABLE IMPORT OF MEDICINES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH GRAVE 
PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEMS? (2008), available at http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/Arbet 
somr%C3%A5den/WTO/Handel%20och%20skydd%20f%C3%B6r%20immateriella%20r%C3%A4ttig
heter%20-%20TRIPS/Rapport%20The_WTO_decision_on_compulsory_licensing.pdf [hereinafter 
National Board of Trade]. 
39 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  The TRIPS 
Agreement was created as a result of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations 
and contains rules on patents and other forms of intellectual property.  Id.  Adherence to the TRIPS 
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the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Article 
31bis”), a statement of intent adopted by the WTO in 2001, serves as a companion 
to the TRIPS Agreement, although there has yet to be a formal amendment.40  
Article 31bis clarifies and confirms that member states have the right to grant 
compulsory licenses to protect public health and gives broad discretion to do so.41  
The general purpose of Article 31 is to allow any WTO Member to issue a 
compulsory license after fulfilling certain requirements42 – many of which are 
unclear or subject to broad interpretation.43  Interestingly, nowhere within Article 
31 of the TRIPS Agreement do the words “compulsory license” appear.44  
However, in reference to patent usage Article 31 does allow for “use without 
authorization of the right holder,” thus allowing a compulsory license to be 
issued.45  Before a country can grant a compulsory license each license must be 
“considered on its individual merits;”46 attempts to obtain authorization from the 
right holder on reasonable commercial grounds must have failed;47 the compulsory 
license must be limited in scope and duration to the purpose for which it was 
issued;48 the license must be used “predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market” of country issuing the license;49 and lastly the owner of the patent must be 
“paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account 
the economic value of the authorization.”50  These requirements are much too 
lenient and imprecise to protect the interests of countries with legitimate 
pharmaceutical patents.   
                                                          
Agreement means that all WTO member states, in theory, must maintain a minimum level of 
intellectual property protection.  Cass, supra note 22, at 12-13. The TRIPS Agreement was developed in 
response to “concerns in developed nations that the intellectual property rights of their nationals were 
not sufficiently respected internationally and that remedies for addressing derogations from intellectual 
property rights were not sufficiently strong.”  Id.  The TRIPS Agreement “is to date the most 
comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property.”  See World Trade Organization, 
Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
40 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; see also 
Catherine Saez, Drug Access Waiver Debate Looms for June TRIPS Council Meeting, Intellectual 
Property Watch, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/05/31/drug-access-waiver-debate-
looms-for-june-trips-council-meeting/ (commenting on recent consultations between WTO members 
who are discussing expanding the scope the Doha Declaration, and noting the difficulties of holding a 
technical workshop to evaluate the “paragraph 6” amendment because of the widely differing views on 
the outcome). 
41 See World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WT/L/540 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter Implementation of Paragraph 6].  The 2003 decision ratified the 
Doha Declaration and created a special mechanism for compulsory licenses to enhance access to 
patented pharmaceuticals by counties with limited manufacturing capabilities.  See Bartelt, supra note 
38. 
42 See National Board of Trade, supra note 38. 
43 Hunter, supra note 23, at 372. 
44 See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 31. 
45 World Trade Organization, Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm00_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
46 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 31(a). 
47 See id., art. 31(b). 
48 See id., art. 31(c)-(e), (g). 
49 Id. art., 31(f). 
50 Id. art., 31(h). 
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The language of Article 31 gives wide deference to WTO members in 
deciding what grounds a compulsory license can be used, no longer referring 
strictly to failure to adequately use the patent in the market as the only 
justification.51  In addition to this broad deference, Article 31 provides several 
potential reasons for authorizing a compulsory license.  First, Article 31(b) 
suggests that a national emergency, circumstances of extreme urgency, or public 
non-commercial use could justify issuance of a compulsory license.52  Next, 
Article 31(k) provides that a compulsory license may be used to correct anti-
competitive behavior such as “failure to work.”53  And lastly, Article 31(l) allows a 
compulsory license for the use of an essential “second patent,” which cannot be 
exploited without infringing on another “first patent.”54  In this case, the 
compulsory license is allegedly justified only where the second patent involves an 
important technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to 
the invention claimed in the first patent.55   
The use of a compulsory license will only be permitted if there have been 
unsuccessful efforts to obtain authorization from the patent holder – which requires 
reasonable commercial terms and the commencement of negotiations for a 
reasonable period of time.56  However, the requirement of a reasonable negotiation 
period will be waived for a WTO Member country under three scenarios: (1) in the 
case of a national emergency, (2) other circumstances of extreme urgency, or (3) in 
cases of public non-commercial use.57  Lastly, and possibly most contentious, 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement states that after a WTO Member nation is 
authorized to issue a compulsory license, the use must be limited to the “supply of 
the domestic market.”58 
Article 31(f) has been sharply criticized as being too restrictive because 
pharmaceutical production is predominantly concentrated in high-income 
countries, and many developing countries lack the capacity for pharmaceutical 
production entirely.59  Article 31(f), therefore, allegedly acted to prevent countries 
with insufficient or non-existent pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities from 
                                                          
51 See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39.  Notably, Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement 
clarifies that a WTO member state’s national law may provide “limited exceptions” to exclusive rights, 
“provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent 
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties.”  Such exceptions include de minimis and educational uses.  See id.  
52 See id., art. 31(b), (k), (l).  While these exceptions provide some guidance, it is worth noting that 
nowhere in the text of Article 31 does the WTO provide definitions for “national emergency,” 
“circumstances of extreme urgency,” or “public non-commercial use.”  See generally id. 
53 See id., art. 31(k). 
54 See id., art. 31(l). 
55 Id.   
56 National Board of Trade, supra note 38, at 7. 
57 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 31(b). 
58 Id., art. 31(f). 
59 Vera Zolotaryova, Are We There Yet? Taking “TRIPS” To Brazil and Expanding Access to 
HIV/AIDS Medication, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1099, 1103 (2008) (noting that because certain non-
epidemic conditions are now seen as an urgent enough health emergency to necessitate a compulsory 
license, the use of compulsory licenses is likely to increase worldwide to the exclusion of countries with 
little or no manufacturing capabilities). 
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issuing compulsory licenses.60  In response to the human rights activists’ outcry on 
this matter, the Ministerial Conference of the WTO met in Doha Qatar in 2001, 
and developed a Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
commonly known as the Doha Declaration.61  The Doha Declaration was made 
effective in 2005 when an amendment was added to Article 31 known as Article 
31bis, inserting the language from the Doha Declaration and an Annex to the WTO 
Article 31 framework.62  The amendment was composed of three waivers under 
Article 31.63  The result of these waivers was to significantly ease the requirements 
that production be “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.”64  This 
change is significant because the exporting countries’ duty under Article 31(f) is 
now waived, thereby allowing compulsory licenses to be produced in one country 
and then exported to another.65  Additionally, under this new framework, only the 
exporting country is responsible for adequate remuneration.66  The result is that 
multiple countries are benefiting from the compulsory license, but the 
responsibility is borne solely by the exporting country – thus creating an incentive 
for countries with manufacturing capabilities to urge those without to acquire 
compulsory licenses.  Similarly, re-export of the pharmaceutical produced under 
the license is allowed among members of a regional trade agreement.67  This 
                                                          
60 Id. at 1107.  WTO member countries with no manufacturing capabilities were unable to make use 
of the compulsory licensing scheme for lack of production capabilities.  Id. at 1108.  Without the ability 
to manufacture pharmaceuticals within their own country a compulsory license did not serve to alleviate 
the problem.  Id. at 1107. 
61 Doha Declaration, supra note 40. 
62 The Doha Declaration was implemented shortly after the U.S. considered issuing a compulsory 
license in order to get sufficient amounts of Anthrax antibiotics claiming an epidemic situation.  See 
Fact Sheet, supra note 35. 
63 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, at 7. 
64 See Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 41. 
65 See Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at 6 (stating that “[t]he TRIPS Agreement does not and 
should not prevent [WTO] Members from taking measures to protect public health.  Accordingly, while 
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health 
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.  Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
emphasized “recogni[tion] that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the 
TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem 
and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.”). 
66 Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 41.  The WTO General Council affirmed that 
Paragraph 6 should be implemented to allow countries with limited manufacturing capabilities, to issue 
compulsory licenses to other countries who have manufacturing capabilities and who could then export 
the pharmaceuticals to countries lacking production facilities.  Notably, under the General Council’s 
orders “[t]he obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be 
waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory licence [sic] to the extent necessary for the 
purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing 
Member(s)….”  Id. 
67 See id.  
[W]here a developing or least-developed country WTO Member is a party to a 
regional trade agreement within the meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 
and the Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable 
[sic] Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries 
(L/4903), at least half of the current membership of which is made up of 
countries presently on the United Nations list of least developed countries, the 
obligation of that Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be 
waived to the extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product produced or 
128 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. VI:I 
 
practice expands the reach of Article 31 and diminishes the capacity for the patent 
owner to profit in foreign markets – which can lead to a decrease in total foreign 
investment.68  These changes create the possibility for compulsory licenses to be 
granted such that one country can produce pharmaceuticals for another, opening 
the floodgates for potential misuse and further loss of patent control. 
Although there had been some debate about whether the grounds on which a 
compulsory license can be issued under Article 31 were exclusive, the Doha 
Declaration confirmed that member states have the “freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”69  This “freedom” creates a great 
deal of subjective power resting with developing nations in the determination of 
whether to issue a compulsory license.70  Similarly, under the new WTO 
framework, each member shall have the right to determine what constitutes a 
national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency.71  This deference to 
WTO members is far too broad and subjective, and will allow countries to claim 
circumstances requiring issuance of compulsory licenses without adequate need or 
an unbiased analysis of the situation. 
The response to the Doha Declaration in the developed world has not been 
positive.  The United States agreed not to use the amendment as an importing 
member, because it saw the need to protect investments from unauthorized usage72 
– this is the correct approach to protect long-term goals of innovation.  The broad 
text of the TRIPS Agreement was intended to grant each nation the authority to 
promote public health, but the new loosely defined language lacks objective 
guidelines, and thereby creates an atmosphere for further patent abuses worldwide. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING TO THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Creating an Environment for Innovation 
The United States has contributed to more top diagnostic and therapeutic 
innovations than any other country.73  Similarly, in the area of pharmaceutical 
innovations, the United States has produced more than the European Union and 
                                                          
imported under a compulsory licence [sic] in that Member to be exported to the 
markets of those other developing or least developed country parties to the 
regional trade agreement that share the health problem in question. 
 Id. 
68 Cass, supra note 22, at 22 (explaining the importance of intellectual property protection as a key 
factor to the enormous contribution that innovators have made in recent history, particularly in the area 
of human health). 
69 Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at para. 5(b). 
70 Brent Savoie, Thailand’s Test: Compulsory Licensing in an Era of Epidemiological Transition, 
48 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 219 (2007); see also Doha Declaration, supra note 56, at para. 6. 
71 See Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at para. 6. 
72 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 158 n.86.  Many countries agreed not to use Article 31bis as 
importing members because of the fear that implementation would detrimentally diminish patent 
protections abroad. 
73 Tyler Cowen, Poor U.S. Scores in Health Care Don’t Measure Nobel and Innovation, 
N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006 (noting that the “cream of the crop” in contributions to basic medical science 
is to count the number of Nobel prizes in medicine and physiology.  Of the ninety-five Nobel Prize 
recipients for medical related innovations in the past forty years, fifty-seven of them, roughly sixty 
percent of the total, were from the United States). 
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Switzerland combined – in spite of having a smaller total population.74  The 
innovator-friendly environment created by a protective patent system in the United 
States directly answers the question of why the United States contributes 
disproportionately to the production of pharmaceuticals.75  For example, 
approximately forty percent of the United States economic growth is dependent 
upon intellectual property protection of some kind.76  A great example is the Pfizer 
Company, currently the world’s largest research-based pharmaceutical company, 
employing over 85,000 people, and investing almost sixty billion dollars each year 
in the pursuit of new and beneficial treatments.77 
Although many factors are surely relevant to how the United States has 
managed to create such a healthy environment for intellectual property, the 
predominant contributor is monetary compensation.78  Individuals and firms will 
tend to invest more in medical innovation when they can expect larger returns, the 
returns sustain for a longer period of time, and when profits are realized without 
undue delay.79  These three factors all directly relate to the ease of use and 
protective nature of the patent system in the United States, which allows exclusive 
protection for twenty years to patent holders.80  In recent years, the United States 
has accounted for forty-five percent of worldwide pharmaceutical sales, as 
compared to Europe’s twenty-seven to thirty percent and Japan’s nine to twelve 
percent.81  The United States attracts high quality innovators mainly because of 
monetary incentives.82  The population of Europe is one hundred and fifty percent 
larger than the United States, and Japan is forty-two percent larger, so the greater 
contribution of the United States cannot be attributed to its population size alone.83  
Additionally, the United States is over-represented as a base of operations for top 
pharmaceutical firms.84  Of the top fifteen pharmaceutical firms, measured by 
pharmaceutical revenues, eight are based in the United States, six in Europe, and 
one in Japan.85  These factors are unlikely to be a coincidence.  Although the firms 
may have located in the United States for historic reasons, it is most likely that a 
superior business climate cultivated by strong patent protection is a major factor – 
                                                          
74 Iain Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Public-private Interaction and the Productivity of 
Pharmaceutical Research (Cambridge Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6018, 
1997); DIMASI, supra note 2 (analyzing a list of “impact drugs” as those having the most impact on 
therapeutic science between 1965 and 1992, combined with a list of the twenty-five most prescribed 
drugs in the world). 
75 Id. 
76 Cowen, supra note 73, at 5 (explaining that intellectual property is used in many areas of 
business, but carries significant importance in the pharmaceutical industry). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 See Jenna Greve, Healthcare in Developing Countries and the Role of Business: A Global 
Governance Framework to Enhance the Accountability of Pharmaceutical Companies, CORP. 
GOVERNANCE 2008 WLNR 16938575 (Sep. 7, 2008) (noting that the monopoly power created by a 
patent is the cornerstone of many pharmaceutical companies which rely on intellectual property to 
survive). 
80 Id. 
81 JOHN NORTHRUP, THE BUSINESS OF HEALTH CARE INNOVATION (Lawton Robert Burns ed., 
Cambridge University Press 2005). 
82 Id. 
83 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (1994). 
84 NORTHRUP, supra note 81, at 2-3. 
85 Id. 
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a factor that must also be taken into account when investing abroad.86   
B. Bilateral Investment Treaties and the United States 
After the Doha Declaration and creation of Article 31bis, the landscape upon 
which a compulsory license could be granted changed significantly.87  A major 
question arises: how will the application of Article 31bis affect the future of the 
pharmaceutical industry in the United States?  In the wake of the Doha 
Declaration, much attention was given to investment treaty arbitration, but much 
less was written about intellectual property issues arising under BITs,88 and even 
less so in relation to claims for expropriation after the issuance of a compulsory 
licenses.89  Thus, pharmaceutical companies must now be careful both when 
investing within the Unites States, and especially when participating in foreign 
direct investments abroad. 
Increasingly, investors from the United States may be able to seek recourse 
through alternative means of dispute settlement because of threats to business 
through the use of compulsory licensing abroad.90  The WTO’s Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes91 provides for 
settlement of trade claims between states, and may be relevant if the state 
authorizing the compulsory license has failed to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement’s requirements.92  However, the investor from the United States may 
also wish to consider bringing a claim in investor-state arbitration directly against 
the host state under the terms of a BIT.93  As compulsory licensing becomes more 
common, investors should weigh the benefits of investment arbitration and 
potential claims for indirect expropriation. 
A majority of intellectual property disputes involve the patent owner suing a 
non-contracting party for alleged infringement of the owner’s exclusive patent 
                                                          
86 Rudolph Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property (1981) 75 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 553, 580 (especially for international investors, reliance and legitimate expectations 
contribute to “a continuous and increased international flow of capital, which…is crucial for the 
development and stabilization of the international economy in general, and the economy of developing 
countries in particular”). 
87 Id. at 581. 
88 Correa, Bilateral Investment, supra note 3; UNCTAD, Intellectual Property Provisions in 
International Investment Agreements on Regulations and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
INTELL. PROP. Q. UPDATE, at 2 (2006). 
89 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 285. 
90 Id. at 286.  Bird and Cahoy note that the current dispute-settlement framework provided through 
bilateral investment treaties between nations might be the best way to insure greater protections for 
United States pharmaceutical companies investing abroad.  Id.  Bird and Cahoy suggest that in light of 
the overly flexible requirements of the WTO’s Article 31, the use of bilateral investment treaties should 
be considered as a better means of increased protection.  Id. 
91 Id.; see World Trade Organization Agreement, Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu 
_e/dsu_e.htm (explaining that “[t]he rules and procedures of this Understanding shall also apply to 
consultations and the settlement of disputes between Members concerning their rights and obligations 
under the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization…and of this 
Understanding taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered agreement”). 
92 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 286-87. 
93 Id.   
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rights.94  Most of these disputes are resolved through litigation between private 
parties in the courts of a country where the patent owner has registered with the 
national patent office.95  In many cases, the parties to the private litigation have no 
prior interaction and have not decided on a settlement framework.96  Without a 
prior agreement the parties usually default to private litigation through the national 
court system in the country where the investment was made, which may be 
nationalistic and generally unfavorable to foreign investors.97 
Understanding the dispute settlement framework will be helpful for investors 
from the United States.  The possibility of investor-state arbitration offers a unique 
avenue to protect intellectual property for pharmaceutical companies engaged in 
foreign investment.98  For example, in a claim arising from a WTO member’s 
conduct that infringes on exclusive patent usage, such as the use of a compulsory 
license, the BIT may provide protection to support a claim brought directly against 
the WTO member in an international tribunal.99  Most BITs, which are first 
negotiated by two separate government states, contain a dispute resolution clause 
in which the contracting governments agree that if an investment dispute arises 
with a foreign investor from another contracting state, they will submit to an 
international tribunal for arbitration.100  It has been recognized that this significant 
increase of consent to arbitration between foreign investors and their host states is 
one of the most significant developments in international law in the past forty 
years.101  Regardless of the widespread adoption of BITs, there has yet to be a 
published case of an investor-state arbitration that has reached a settlement under 
the terms of a BIT in an international tribunal.102  Thus to ensure protection, 
investors should be particularly aware of whether their patent has been registered 
                                                          
94 Id. 
95 See 8 CHRISTOPHER GIBSON, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
DISPUTES, THE CALIFORNIA INTERNATIONAL PRACTITIONER (1997). 
96 Id.   
97 See DAVID W. PLANT, RESOLVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES,15 (1999) (noting that 
without an arbitration agreement in place at the time of a dispute, the chances of avoiding the national 
court systems are rare); see also Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in 
International Law, 20:1 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 34, 34-35 (2005) (explaining that 
foreign investors are especially susceptible to regulatory takings because first, “the investor typically 
lacks representation in the political process and may not have any input into decisions that significantly 
affect its investment.  Second, receiving reciprocal advantages in the long-run will not mitigate the 
burdens of regulation where the [foreign] investor hopes to recoup its investment in the short term and 
to leave the jurisdiction.  Third, where government measures result in very severe losses, it is unlikely 
that adequate subsequent benefits will be obtained to off-set losses.  For example, nationalization 
policies are often predicated on the assumption that the foreign investor will be excluded from future 
economic participation in the economy.  Fourth, economic nationalism is often a popular domestic 
policy.  The nationality of the foreign investor makes the foreign investment a target for government 
measures.  Finally, payments of compensation to a foreign investor may be viewed as a political failure, 
and are unlikely to be widely supported by the domestic political constituency.”). 
98 See Newcombe, supra note 97, at 35. 
99 See Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:  Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1528-32 (2005). 
100 LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 40-45 (2004) 
(explaining that the majority of BITs contain provisions allowing for some form of privatized dispute 
settlement). 
101 R. DOAK BISHOP, FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 31 
(2005). 
102 Id. 
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within the host state, as well as the nature of the investment itself and whether the 
type of investment has been subject to investor-state arbitration in the past.103  In 
the event that a compulsory license is issued, the investor should look to whether 
the host-state either violated the broader WTO treaty requirements or whether 
there is a more specific  claim available under an applicable BIT.104 
C.  Need for Better Governance of Compulsory Licenses 
Some form of compulsory licensing statute is common in the national 
systems of many countries, even if not often put to use.105  The United States is an 
example of a country with a limited compulsory licensing structure.106  The 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, in comments during the FTC 
proceedings concerning Dell, stated that: 
The appearance of a United States government agency imposing a compulsory 
patent license, especially a royalty-free compulsory license, must be avoided except 
in response to egregious conduct.  Other countries could cite such an action as the 
basis for imposing broad and onerous compulsory licensing requirements upon 
United States patentees abroad.107 
The various compulsory licensing schemes abroad may have different legal 
bases and be authorized subject to varying executive, and administrative or judicial 
procedures.108  In practice, sometimes the mere threat of using a compulsory 
license is enough to force compliance or a settlement with a pharmaceutical 
company.109  The danger of ambiguous compulsory licensing systems resulting in 
the loss of intellectual property investments can be seen in an example from Egypt.  
Egypt is a country with moderate income and unlimited potential for growth, yet in 
spite of this seeming promise, the amount of intellectual property investment from 
foreign companies has significantly decreased in the last twenty years.110  In the 
                                                          
103 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Mar. 7-11, 2005, Commission on 
Investment, Technology, and Related Financial Issues, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d 
62_en.pdf.  In the arbitration context, despite the significant expansion of patent-based investments 
worldwide disputes between foreign investors and a national government have been limited to 
construction, banking, telecommunications, residential utilities, and various other high risk or hazardous 
activities.  Id. at para. 11. 
104 Id. 
105 In 2008, there were at least one hundred countries that had licensing laws permitting the 
government to authorize compulsory licenses in some form.  Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 292.  
Compulsory licenses have been granted only in limited circumstances in the United States, usually in 
relation to antitrust concerns, such as making the compulsory licensing of a patent a condition for 
approval of a merger between two competing businesses within a single market, or ordering a patent 
license in order to avoid violations of federal law prohibiting unfair competitive practices.  Id. 
106 See Federal Trade Commission, American Intellectual Property Law Association, http://www.ftc 
.gov/opp/global/aipla.shtm (last updated June 25, 2007). 
107 Id. 
108 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 292-93. 
109 See Jerome Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: 
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 249-50 (2009) (describing how a number of 
governments have “quietly begun to use the threat of compulsory licenses to rein in the prices of 
selected medicines”). 
110 See International Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Hearing before the S. Comm. on 
Fin., 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (transcript of Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) available 
at http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=2f938a1a-7683-4de8-9a3a-022c04251365. 
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Middle East, Egypt has one of the worst records in protecting intellectual property 
rights, which has been devastating to its ability to increase trade opportunities and 
attract foreign investors.111  Two months after Pfizer entered the Egyptian market, 
the Egyptian Health Ministry decided to grant a compulsory license to produce 
Viagra to all Egyptian companies who applied for the rights to produce the generic 
version.112  The generic version of the drug was to be sold at one-twentieth of the 
price of Pfizer’s market price.113  These actions by the Egyptian government 
diminished Egypt’s capacity to attract future foreign investment.  As a result, 
Pfizer canceled plans to build an additional production facility in Egypt,114 and 
pharmaceutical company PhRMA followed suit cancelling a three-hundred million 
dollar investment.115 
The increasing costs of pharmaceuticals come from the expensive research 
and development process, which is needed to produce effective and safe drugs.116  
For context, approximately fifty-six percent of funding for global pharmaceutical 
research is provided for by the private sector, costing over one-hundred billon 
dollars per annum.117  Moreover, most research in the pharmaceutical industry 
does not result in patented medicine; therefore pharmaceutical companies must 
secure earnings that not only cover their research and development costs, but also 
the costs of unsuccessful research.118  A decrease in research would most likely 
reduce the rate of medical progress and innovation across the globe.119  The 
monopoly power created by a patent is essential for pharmaceutical companies to 
earn enough money to stay in business and to finance subsequent research and 
development projects.120   
When a compulsory license is issued, the private funds have already been 
invested into the product, so once the license takes effect, the investment cannot be 
taken back.121  Compulsory licenses are retroactive by nature, meaning that the 
pharmaceutical is already patented and the patent holder only loses his exclusive 
right over the patented product after the compulsory license is issued.122  The 
underlying problem occurs because once the compulsory license is issued, the 
incentive to invest in the future is reduced.  This foreseeable reduction in 
investment could also have a major impact on global health. 
Under the Article 31 amendments, each WTO member has the authority to 
                                                          
111 See Abeer Allam, Seeking Investment Egypt Tries Patent Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/04/business/seeking-investment-egypt-tries-patent-
laws.html (noting that Egypt’s compulsory licensing statute is overly broad, creating weak protections 
for intellectual property). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 306. 
115 Id. at 308. 
116 See Greve, supra note 79 (explaining that research and development is one of the most time 
consuming and costly components of a successful pharmaceutical company). 
117 Id. (noting that funding is not primarily coming from the public sector or the government, but 
rather from private industry). 
118 Id. at 8. 
119 Id. 
120 See id. 
121 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3. 
122 Id. 
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grant a compulsory license, and has great discretion for doing so.123  Generally, 
developing nations have weaker intellectual property protections and are therefore 
more likely to issue compulsory licenses on patented pharmaceutical products than 
are developed countries.124  For fear of not regaining the cost of research and 
development, United States pharmaceutical companies will stop devoting their 
time and energy into discovering new cures for diseases, which are ironically most 
needed in the developing world, and instead focus on more profitable endeavors.125 
IV. RECENT USES OF COMPULSORY LICENSES AND HOW ARTICLE 31BIS 
APPLICATION COULD PROVE TO BE PARTICULARLY HARMFUL 
A.  Recent Uses 
Most countries have some national compulsory licensing system in place, 
even if rarely used.126  Global health projections leave little doubt that chronic 
diseases are rapidly overtaking infectious diseases, such as malaria, AIDS and 
tuberculosis, as the world’s deadliest diseases; a shift emphasized by recent World 
Health Organization (WHO) reports on global health.127  Many of these chronic 
diseases, such as obesity, are best regulated through education, healthy eating, and 
regular exercise.128  Yet, in a culture which demands a “quick fix” for everything, 
the use of compulsory licenses to fix these chronic problems is not surpising. 
While many countries have adopted compulsory licensing statutes and claim 
to protect foreign investors, there has been much uncertainty in many cases about 
whether a national statute providing for compulsory licenses is in compliance with 
the standards from Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.129  To date, there have 
been relatively few high-profile grants of compulsory licenses by governmental 
authorities for reasons other than antitrust concerns.130  One of the most 
                                                          
123 Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at 6. 
124 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2008 Special 301 Report 37 (2008), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf.  The special report is a tool 
used to pinpoint problems in intellectual property rights protection in countries that are engaged in trade 
with the United States.  Id.  A significant number of countries the United States has placed on the 
Watch List are developing nations.  Id. 
125 See Baucus, supra note 110. 
126 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 292. 
127 The WTO report said populations are aging partly due to success against infectious diseases, and 
changing patterns of food, alcohol and tobacco consumption.  World Health Organization, Fact Sheet 
No. 311: Obesity & Overweight, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2011).  Fact Sheet No. 311 emphasizes that while deaths from infectious diseases, 
maternal conditions and poor nutrition would fall by three percent in the next decade; deaths from 
chronic disease will increase by seventy-one percent.  Id.  Cases of diabetes, heart disease and stroke, 
for which major weight gain is a big risk factor, are predicted to rise rapidly as the obesity epidemic 
takes hold in the developing world.  Id. 
128 See Fact Sheet, supra note 45. 
129 See Ching-fu Lin, Filling in the Gaps of the TRIPS Agreement: Reflections on the Taiwan-
Philips CR-R Compulsory License Case, 3 ASIAN J. WORLD TRADE ORG. & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
557 (2008) (Lin describes Taiwan’s issuance of a compulsory license under Article 76 of Taiwan’s 
Patent Act with respect to Philips’ recordable compact disk patents and argues that both the issuance of 
the license and Taiwan’s Patent Act were valid and consistent with Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement).  Additionally, the article notes that there has yet to be a WTO arbitration settlement or 
official report that directly interprets the language of Article 31.  Id. 
130 Id. 
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contentious recent instances involves a compulsory license issued by the Brazilian 
government.131  In May 2007, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva signed 
a document, which established a compulsory license to enable Brazil to make or 
import a generic version of the patented HIV treatment drug, Efavirenz.132   
This case is significant for a number of reasons, one being that before the 
compulsory license was issued, Brazil had rejected an offer by the patent owner, 
Merk & Co., to voluntarily discount the price for its drug by thirty percent.133  
These decisions by governments unwilling to negotiate on price have been viewed 
as controversial, raising concerns by the United States Trade Representative.134  
Rather than claiming a failure to comply with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
Merck issued a statement focusing on foreign investment, characterizing the 
Brazilian government’s decision to issue the compulsory license as a form of 
indirect expropriation.135  Merck stated that “[t]his expropriation of intellectual 
property sends a chilling signal to research-based companies about the 
attractiveness of undertaking risky research on diseases that affect the developing 
world,” and harshly emphasized that “[t]his decision. . .will have a negative impact 
on Brazil’s reputation as an industrialized country seeking to attract inward 
investment.  False”136   
Brazil’s issuance of a compulsory license sets a bad example for other 
nations because it encourages the use of compulsory licensing provisions for 
countries with middle-class income levels purely to lower the cost of 
pharmaceuticals.137  Further, Brazil has the twelfth largest economy in the 
world,138 a relatively low rate of HIV/AIDS infection, and is better situated to pay 
for or produce the medications needed itself compared to poorer countries that are 
suffering from HIV/AIDS on an epidemic proportion.139  In spite of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s backlash at Brazil’s actions in issuing compulsory 
licenses for its citizens, Brazil has recently proposed expanding the scope of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS framework, making it easier to compel any 
kind of drug on the market for generic production at lower cost.140  Regardless of 
                                                          
131 Jon Cohen, Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma Patents, 316 SCI. MAG. 816 (May 11, 2007), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/316/5826/816.full.pdf?sid=6ce9c1ef-fa09-4e95-8062-c192d3288a 
26 (last visited May 2005). 
132 Keith Alcorn, Brazil Issues Compulsory License on Efaverinz, AIDSMAP NEWS (May 7, 2007), 
http://www.aidsmap.com/page/1427206/. 
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134 In April 2007 the U.S. Trade Representative cited the issuing of compulsory licenses as one 
reason for elevating countries like Brazil to the Priority Watch List, a U.S. government warning to 
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the U.S. Trade Representative’s watch list has the effect of deterring future investment and could 
potentially lead to increases of export tariffs.  Id. 
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136 Merck & Co., Inc., Statement on Brazilian Government’s Decision to Issue Compulsory License 
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Brazil’s intentions and claims of suffering from a legitimate emergency, the 
requirement under Article 31, that countries must first try to negotiate with patent 
owners before granting compulsory licenses should not be so easily waived or 
should, at the very least, require additional objective standards. 
Likewise, in Thailand the government has issued compulsory licenses for 
multiple kinds of pharmaceutical drugs.  The first was for the same drug used in 
Brazil, Efavirenz; next it was for Kaletra, which is also used to treat HIV/AIDS, 
and lastly for Plavix, which is used to treat cardiovascular conditions such as heart 
disease.141  The issuance of a compulsory license for Plavix in Thailand is 
significant for a number of reasons.  First, Thailand, like Brazil, is a middle-
income country, and better situated to pay the market price for needed 
medications.142  However, nowhere in the TRIPS Article 31 framework does the 
WTO consider the income level of member states when determining whether to 
issue a compulsory license.143  Secondly, Thailand’s compulsory license for Plavix 
was the first of its kind issued for a chronic disease rather than an infectious 
disease.144  Breaking ground in this area, the Thai government has lowered the bar 
to allow all kinds of patented medications to be considered for compulsory 
licensing.145  Furthermore, Thailand issued the compulsory license for Plavix 
under Article 31’s exception for public non-commercial use rather than the 
national emergency exception,146 which is yet to be defined by the WTO.147   
This usage, therefore, has significantly widened the scope in terms of which 
ailments are considered severe enough by the WTO to compel an unwilling patent 
owner to issue a license.148  To make matters worse, at the time Thailand issued 
the compulsory license for Kaletra, the pharmaceutical company who owned the 
patent was already selling the drug to Thailand at a discounted price.149  
Interestingly, because Thailand issued the compulsory license under the public 
non-commercial use exception, Article 31(b) waives the normal WTO requirement 
that the member state must first make reasonable efforts to participate in 
negotiations with the patent holder before issuing a compulsory license.150 
                                                          
Committee on the Law of Patents, citing the historically limited use of currently existing patent 
exceptions as justification for expansion of compulsory licensing.  Id.   
141 See Press Release, Abbott Laboratories, Thailand Abbott Laboratories Won’t Introduce New 
Drugs in Thailand due to Breaking of Patent (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.aegis.org/news/ads/2007/ 
AD070549.html [hereinafter Abbott Press Release]. 
142 Zolotaryova, supra note 137, at 1108. 
143 See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39. 
144 See Abbott Press Release, supra note 141.  The significance of issuing compulsory licenses for 
chronic illnesses, such as heart disease, is that these diseases are found worldwide and are best treated 
by changes in diet and exercise.  Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/en/index.html; see also infra Section 
IV.B. 
145 Id.   
146 Zolotaryova, supra note 137, at 1109. 
147 Simon Montlake, Thailand Widens Scope of Generic Drugs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 31, 
2007), http:/www.csmonitor.com/2007/0231/p07s02-woap.html. 
148 Id. 
149 See Abbott Press Release, supra note 141. 
150 See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, Article 31(b) (explaining that WTO members 
are not required to negotiate with the lawful patent holder if the country is using the patent for a “public 
non-commercial use”). 
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The examples from Thailand and Brazil display the unfortunate truth that the 
compulsory licensing system under the WTO framework has the potential to 
infringe on the proper functioning of the pharmaceutical markets and world 
health.151  As pharmaceutical companies realize the potential for patents to be used 
without their consent, they may follow the example of Abbott Laboratories, which 
decided to divest from the Thai market awaiting national patent system reform.152  
Abbott withdrew seven pending patent registration applications for new medicines 
in Thailand in response to compulsory licensing.153  As a result of the withdrawal 
of investment within these countries, citizens will suffer because hesitant 
pharmaceutical companies may no longer wish to invest or introduce new and 
useful medicines.154 
B.  Significance of Article 31bis 
With the addition of Article 31bis155 and the statement on the 
implementation of the Doha Declaration,156 parameters for the issuance of 
compulsory licenses are increasingly unclear.  The Doha Declaration stood for the 
proposition that developing nations who are unable to manufacture 
pharmaceuticals should be authorized to import generic versions of drugs from 
nations with more developed manufacturing capabilities.157  In addition to the 
obvious issues relating to dilution of investment, another problem with importing 
generic drugs under a compulsory license is that the drugs likely would originate 
from countries such as India and China,158 which have limited quality-control 
inspection abilities.159  These potentially unsafe generic drugs can cause serious 
harm when they enter into a market and become hard to control.160 
 
 i.  Broad deference 
 
Article 31bis affirms that “[e]ach [WTO] member has the right to determine 
what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme 
urgency.”161  This language is problematic because it gives wide discretion to each 
WTO member to decide under which circumstances a compulsory license may be 
                                                          
151 Montlake, supra note 147, at 5. 
152 See Abbott Press Release, supra note 141. 
153 Savoie, supra note 70, at 219. 
154 See Zolotaryova, supra note 137, at 110. 
155 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39. 
156 Doha Declaration, supra note 40. 
157 Id.  It should be noted that the original TRIPS agreement was in fact initiated for opposite 
purposes – namely to protect the intellectual property rights of international investors whose rights were 
not being sufficiently protected by developing countries.  Id. 
158 Marc Kaufman, FDA Scrutiny Scant in India, China as Drugs Pour into U.S., WASH. POST, June 
17, 2007, http://www.nipcweb.com/FDA_Scrutiny_%20India_China.pdf (noting that since 2001 India 
and China have become major suppliers in the international generic drug market). 
159 Id. (noting that quality-control inspections are rarely conducted by the Food and Drug 
Administrations in India and China.  For comparison, in 2005, the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) conducted over 1,200 quality inspections in the United States, but only 200 inspections were 
done in China and India in the last seven years.) 
160 Id. 
161 Doha Declaration, supra note 40, at para. 5(c). 
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appropriate.162  The amendment also claims that it is “understood that public health 
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.”163  The terms “national emergency” and “circumstances of extreme 
urgency” have been used to describe a variety of situations within countries 
wishing to issue a compulsory license.164  While the WTO has recognized that a 
national emergency may include public health crises such as AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, there is no clear definition or standard for determining which other 
emergencies would justify the issuance of a compulsory license.165  While any of 
these listed emergencies may create a legitimate need for intervention, the trend 
has been toward issuing compulsory licenses to countries suffering from diseases 
treatable through preventative measures, such as some cardiovascular diseases.166  
For example, the WHO has recognized that obesity has reached “epidemic” 
proportions in many Western countries, while also acknowledging that obesity is 
best treated through changes in diet and exercise.167  If cardiovascular diseases are 
most effectively treated through lifestyle changes, there should not be a way for 
compulsory licenses to be issued for cardiovascular medications merely for cost 
saving purposes.  Such naivety cloaked in good will creates an atmosphere where 
countries are able to abuse the system in order to obtain cheaper drugs, even when 
there is no clear and immediate need.   
 
ii.  Re-exportation 
 
This broad deference given to WTO member countries under Article 31bis, 
also allows re-exportation among members of a regional trade agreement and 
raises potential public policy concerns by creating ulterior anti-competitive 
motives for countries to issue compulsory licenses.168  If a country is a member to 
a regional trade agreement, Article 31bis waives the requirements that the 
compulsory license be predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the 
country granting the license.169  The amendment thus allows members of a 
regional trade agreement who import generic drugs under a compulsory license to 
also export them to other states so long as those states suffer from the same 
medical problems.170  While the proposed amendment states that “[i]t is 
understood that this will not prejudice the territorial nature of the patent rights in 
question,” the amendment fails to outline detailed requirements for countries privy 
to a regional trade before becoming eligible to receive imports under the 
                                                          
162 See Jamie Feldman, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current Practice, 8 J. INT’L 
BUS. & L. 137, 142-43 (explaining the dangers of compulsory licensing abuse). 
163 See Doha Declaration, supra note 40. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5. 
167 Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http:// 
www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/en/index.html. 
168 Doha Declaration, supra note 40. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
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compulsory license.171  Leaving these kinds of requirements to the discretion of 
each country further expands the scope of Article 31 and diminishes the capacity 
for the patent owner to profit in foreign markets, ultimately leading to a decrease in 
foreign investment.172  Without detailed provisions on the circumstances in which 
a compulsory license can be issued, there is a risk that countries participating in 
regional trade agreements will be able to siphon off generic pharmaceuticals 
without showing true need. 
 
iii.  Adequate Remuneration 
   
Lastly, adequate remuneration for the patent owner under a compulsory 
license is a problem because only the exporting country is responsible for payment 
under Article 31bis.173  Because two countries are involved, both the exporting 
country and the importing country, the responsibility should be borne by both 
parties.  This deference to WTO members is far too broad, and will allow countries 
to claim circumstances requiring issuance of compulsory licenses without adequate 
need or an analysis of the situation by a neutral third party.  The United States 
joined with thirty-two other countries in agreeing not to use the Article 31bis 
amendment as an importing member because of the need to protect investments 
from unauthorized usage.174  This is the correct approach to protect long-term 
goals of innovation within the pharmaceutical industry. 
V. SUGGESTED REFORMATION OF ARTICLE 31 AND POTENTIAL CLAIMS FOR 
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
The history of the TRIPS Agreement negotiations reveal that, behind the 
language of Article 31, are two basic rationales for government intervention: to 
safeguard against a severe epidemic and to ensure the proper functioning of the 
markets.175  These are legitimate goals, but the ends do not justify the means if 
there is inconsistency in interpretation of the standards.  While the WTO continues 
to amend its compulsory licensing statute, foreign governments should consider 
alternatives to compelling a patent against the will of the patent owner.  Investors 
should also consider new methods of patent protection and dispute settlement 
under BITs in international arbitration. 
                                                          
171 Id. 
172 Correa, Investment Protection, supra note 5. 
173 Doha Declaration, supra note 40. 
174 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 3, at 158 n.86.  The countries other than the United States that agreed 
not to use Article 31bis as an importing member include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  Id.  With the 
expansion of the European Union, the list now includes ten more:  Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  Id. 
175 See Anthony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: “Adequate Remuneration” for Non-Voluntary Patent 
Licensing, 11:4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 947 n.91 (2008) (noting that during the TRIPS Agreement 
negotiations, members of the Swiss Delegation suggested that compulsory licenses may be needed to 
serve overriding public interests, such as in the case of a health epidemic, or to safeguard the proper 
functioning of the markets by overriding the temporary monopoly of a patent holder who is withholding 
use entirely). 
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A.  Alternatives to Compulsory Licenses 
 i.  Anticipating Volatility 
 
Some pharmaceutical firms are beginning to lower drug prices for poorer 
nations, hoping to smooth access to faster-growing emerging markets, and make 
up for sluggish growth in the United States, Japan and Europe.176  Taking 
alternative measures to increase access to medicines may be a proactive step 
pharmaceutical companies can take to avoid the harsh consequences of compulsory 
licensing.  For example, GlaxoSmithKline and Sanofi-Aventis have both promised 
to cut prices in some developing countries, selling at half or a quarter of the price 
they are receiving in the developed world.177  These price-cuts provide a better 
way for markets to work, and yet still supply those in need with the most cutting 
edge medications. 
Similarly, China is facing new challenges in the area of pharmaceutical 
patent protection.  In 2009, China’s State Intellectual Property Office issued more 
than 580,000 patents – up forty-one percent from a year earlier.178  This large 
increase in innovation resulted in substantial revisions to China’s national patent 
laws.179  Because of the perception of weak international patent protection, China’s 
new laws have been criticized as being overly protectionist, granting more patents 
to national companies and discriminating against foreign companies wishing to 
invest in China’s growing economy.180  Additionally, United States companies like 
Pfizer, who have significant research and development investments in China, may 
be negatively impacted by the new regulations, which force patent holders to 
license their patents to other producers if patents aren’t “fully exploited” or if 
patent owners are deemed to be using the patents in an anti-competitive manner.181  
It is unclear how China will determine whether a patent is being misused, or how 
much patent owners will be paid if they are forced to license their patent under a 
compulsory license.182  This recent example from China shows how changes in 
national patent law might be in conflict with the TRIPS Article 31 requirements, 
                                                          
176 Ben Hirschler, “Silent Pandemic” Will Force Drug Price Rethink, (Jan. 20, 2010) http://www. 
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60J36O20100120 (explaining that “Drugs for diseases which were 
previously dominant only in the rich, well-fed world, such as diabetes, heart disease and cancer, are 
increasingly in demand in poorer nations in Asia and Africa, whose populations are now living 
longer”).  Worth noting is the author’s warning of the compulsory licensing systems’ effect on 
competition, suggesting that when countries:  
[d]iscount[] prices for poorer countries, a move already made by some big drug 
firms…pharmaceutical bosses will also be under pressure to join patent pools to 
promote downward price pressure on drugs for major chronic diseases by 
increasing the number of producers, and may face legal challenges to force them 
to allow in more generic competition.   
Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Loretta Chao, China Issued a Record Number of Patents in 2009, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2010, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527/. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. China’s new laws will allow China to issue a compulsory license if the government decides 
that a patent is being underutilized.  Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
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and provides an example of the need for a more protective and predictable system 
worldwide.183   
 
 ii.  Patent Linkage 
 
Patent linkage is another option that large pharmaceutical companies like 
Bayer have utilized.  Patent linkage occurs where a country’s food and drug 
regulatory arm is petitioned to agree to an order delaying the introduction of a 
generic version of a patented drug until the expiration of the original drug’s 
patent.184  While linkage strategies will create better protection for patent holders, 
the practice is generally seen by public health activists as a hostile attempt to 
prevent generic medicines from reaching those who need them most.185  A more 
effective method might be for pharmaceutical companies to work with generic 
drug manufacturers within developing countries to prevent the need for 
compulsory licensing while remaining profitable.186  If pharmaceutical companies 
take the lead on creating legitimate generic medicines, these drugs will more likely 
reach those who need them, thus preventing the threat of a compulsory license, and 
allowing patent holders to retain control.   
B.  Recommendations: WTO Amendments  
Given the current potential for misuse of the compulsory licensing law as 
well as the difficulties faced by countries with legitimate need but with no 
manufacturing capabilities of their own, other options could be suitably explored 
so as to attain proper balance between the humanitarian efforts and competitive 
needs of the pharmaceutical sectors in developing countries.  Contrary to the belief 
of many humanitarian activists, there is no evidence that an overly protective IP 
policy necessarily will lead to less competition.187  Statistical analysis of modern 
trends in foreign investment reveals that the more protections and incentives 
countries give to innovators, the more likely they are to invest time and money 
discovering new life-saving medications.188  While bringing the fruits of 
                                                          
183 Jingyuan Sun, China’s State Council Publishes New Implementing Rules for the New Patent 
Law, LEXOLOGY, Jan. 22, 2010, available at http:www.lexology.com/library/. 
184 Priyanka Golikeri, While Bayer Pushes Patent, EU Parliamentary Group Opposes, DNA INDIA, 
(Feb. 16, 2010) http://www. dnaindia.com/money/report_while-bayer-pushes-patent-eu-parliamentary-
group-opposes_1348342 (explaining that a European parliamentary group is planning to call on the EU 
and European Commission, the executive arm of the EU, to not push for provisions such as patent 
linkage in developing countries). 
185 The Pharma Letter, Bayer’s Patent Linkage Appeal to be Heard by India’s Supreme Court, 
(Mar. 2010) http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/28478/bayers-patent-linkage-appeal-to-be-heard-by-
indias-supreme-court.html.  
186 William O. Duperon, Global Competition Versus Regional Interests: FDI and Pharmaceuticals 
in India, 5 J. INT’L L. & TECH. (2010) (noting that by working to promote legitimate generic drugs (as 
opposed to forced compulsory licensing), the “progression of the pharmaceutical industry into generic 
markets may present the possibility of patent protection and affordable drugs coexisting”). 
187 See Arnold, supra note 3, at 3. 
188  Greve, supra note 79.  WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND 
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70 (1969) 
(explaining that patent systems and the protection they provide create incentives to innovate by 
conferring monopoly power for a limited time). 
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pharmaceutical innovation to the wider public is a noble pursuit, the WTO 
compulsory licensing scheme, as it is today, is not a balanced answer.  There must 
be reform to ensure that patent owners are protected and innovators have 
incentives to continue creating the life-saving medications our world needs. 
 
 i.  Moderated Deference 
 
First, the resulting amendment from the Doha Declaration - Article 31bis - 
essentially allows WTO members complete discretion in determining whether to 
grant a compulsory license.189  Instead of paving an avenue for potential abuse, the 
WTO should set guidelines for determining whether a country is legitimately 
suffering a “national emergency” or “circumstance of extreme urgency.”  
Additionally, the decision of whether a WTO member state is actually 
encountering a national emergency or circumstance of extreme urgency should not 
rest solely in the hands of the country issuing the compulsory license.  Rather, it 
should rest with a WTO commission that has experience and can work with the 
nation to take an unbiased look at their situation, and make a decision as to 
whether there is legitimate need for a compulsory license to be issued. 
Furthermore, Article 31(b) should be amended to include detailed 
descriptions of the circumstances under which its exceptions should apply.  As 
written, Article 31(b) waives the requirement that there be reasonable negotiations 
with the patent owner under circumstances of ‘national emergency,’ ‘other 
circumstances of extreme urgency,’ or ‘public non-commercial use.’190  It is 
unclear under Article 31(b) whether these terms are to be read in the conjunctive or 
whether any of the three would fulfill the requirements and activate the waiver of 
reasonable negotiations.191  Without clear definitions from the WTO of these 
terms, and authentication from the WTO on all decisions regarding “national 
emergenc[ies],” “extreme urgency,” and “public non-commercial use,” countries 
will increasingly be able to issue compulsory licenses for any type of drug, and for 
any perceived need. 
 
 ii.  Price Reduction 
 
The need to provide more affordable pharmaceuticals has been addressed by 
both private pharmaceutical producers and countries wishing to provide better 
healthcare to their citizens.  GlaxoKlineSmith has taken a unique approach to the 
problem by taking the offense in trying to provide greater access to medicines in 
poor countries.192  The company plans to create a patent pool for tropical diseases, 
reinvest twenty percent of profits from medicines sold in least developed countries, 
and reduce prices in those countries by seventy-five percent.193  Whether 
                                                          
189 See Doha Declaration, supra note 40. 
190 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39 art. 31(b). 
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192 John Davis, Glaxo’s Witty Tries to Fix an Industry Problem, THE INVIVO BLOG (Jan. 20, 2010) 
http://invivoblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/glaxos-witty-tries-to-fix-industry.html. 
193 Id. 
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GalxoKlineSmith’s plan is partially a public relations ploy to undo negative public 
perception about large pharmaceutical companies, or a response to threats of 
monetary losses through compulsory licenses, the new proposals set the stage for a 
sea change in the way pharmaceutical companies operate under current 
international protections. 
Similarly, the governments of some countries are attempting to intervene in 
the free market to provide cheaper drugs for their citizens.194  The Philippine 
government has been increasingly pushing for drug companies to voluntarily halve 
the prices on a series of life-saving medications.195  Officials at the Philippines 
Department of Health have targeted twenty drugs, which cost two to three times 
more than in some other Asian countries, as potential candidates for the 
program.196  Last August, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroya imposed 
mandatory price controls on a number of hypertension and cancer medications, all 
of which were produced by companies from the United States.197  The choice to 
rely on a law enacted in 2008, allows the Philippine government to impose price 
controls to force drug manufacturers into voluntarily lowering prices.198  This case 
in the Philippines is an example of how some countries are trying alternatives to 
compulsory licensing to lower prices.  Whether these and other alternatives will 
eventually deter investors is yet to be seen. 
C.  The Use of Bilateral Investment Treaties for United States Investors 
Abroad 
i. General Considerations  
American pharmaceutical producers investing abroad will benefit by 
familiarizing themselves with licensing policy developments, as these investors are 
the parties who will be most significantly impacted.199  One huge policy 
development is the increased use of BITs between nations wishing to increase 
trade and create better investment protection.200  Most BITs provide that disputes 
between an investor and the host state can be settled in arbitration, and can provide 
additional protection not found in the vague language of the WTO’s TRIPS Article 
31.201  Protection under the terms of a BIT mean the difference between having to 
                                                          
194 James Hookway, Philippines Seeks Voluntary Drug-Price Cuts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2010, 
available at http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870362660457. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id.  The Philippines, a country of ninety-million people, has been influenced in 2010 by 
upcoming presidential elections, where making medications more affordable is a key issue for the 
outgoing political party.  Id. 
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199 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 484 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the 
expansion of patent-based investments abroad and their unique susceptibility to changes in compulsory 
licensing policy). 
200 See Franck, supra note 99, at 1522 (noting that in the past twelve years, countries have entered 
into approximately 1500 new bilateral investment treaties in order to attract foreign investors and create 
flexibility in the resolution of investment disputes). 
201 Id.  This additional protection, above and beyond that found in the WTO framework is often 
referred to as “TRIPS-plus.”  Id.  Most BITs contain arbitration provisions allowing for private 
arbitration should a dispute arise relating to the investment.  Id. 
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wait on a lengthy process under the WTO’s settlement procedures, or being able to 
bring a case directly against a foreign government in investor-state arbitration 
under the terms of the BIT.202  Additionally, a BIT provides the opportunity for 
two countries to negotiate for protection above and beyond that provided under 
multilateral treaties like the WTO.203 
It is important for investors to know that virtually all BITs contain provisions 
on expropriation in closely parallel if not identical wording.204  Since a compulsory 
license does not actually take away the legal title from the patent holder, investors 
will not have a claim for direct expropriation, but they may have a claim for 
indirect expropriation if their property right is diminished substantially - the effects 
of which would be tantamount to full expropriation.205  It is generally recognized 
in international law that regulatory actions taken by a state government can 
interfere with privately held property rights to such an extent that these rights are 
rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated – even 
though the WTO member state does not intend to expropriate the rights and the 
legal title to the property formally remains with the original patent owner.206  
Intellectual property scholars Jan Paulsson and Zachary Douglas have written 
extensively on the area of indirect expropriation and suggest two stages of 
analysis, first looking at the magnitude of the interference to the property right, and 
second to whether that interference rises to the level of expropriation as referenced 
in the treaty.207  In Christopher Gibson’s article Compulsory Licensing: The Case 
of Indirect Expropriation he suggests analyzing a third factor, namely the character 
and motive behind the regulatory government action on a case-by-case basis.208  
These three factors have been incorporated into Annex B of the U.S. Model BIT 
for determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred under the terms of 
the BIT.209  In theory, as Paulson, Douglas and Gibson explain, these factors 
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203 See Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng, IP Rights Under Investment Agreements: The TRIPS-Plus 
Implications for Enforcement and Protections of Public Interest 18 (South Centre Research Paper No. 
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204 Jan Paulsson & Zachary Douglas, Indirect Expropriation in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, in 
19 ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 
145 (Norbert Horn ed., Kluwer Law International 2004). 
205 Id. at 152 (explaining that most bilateral investment treaties do not define the meaning of 
indirect expropriation and often simply refer to government measures that are the “same,” “equivalent 
to,” or “tantamount to” direct expropriation); see also Newcombe, supra note 97, at 8. 
206 See Newcombe, supra note 97, at 9-10 (quoting Starrett Housing Corporation v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 4 U.S. C.T.R. 122, 154 (1983)). 
207 See Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 204, at 148-49. 
208 Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: the Case of 
Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 357, 382-83 (2010). 
209 See 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Annex B, http://www.ustr.gov./sites/ 
default/files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT]. The United States Model Annex 
suggests the following language for an analysis of indirect expropriation: 
 (a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a 
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-
case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
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would be sufficient for a finding of indirect expropriation in the case of a 
compulsory license, however in practice the BITs using this language could be 
improved to create even greater protection for investors abroad.210 
First, BITs should not merely reference the WTO standards as a minimum 
baseline.211  As Gibson points out, there has been a trend in recent U.S. BITs to 
incorporate the WTO Article 31 standards directly into the expropriation 
analysis.212  One example of this trend is found in the recent U.S.-Uruguay BIT.213  
While the U.S.-Uruguay BIT includes the helpful three-factor analysis from the 
U.S. Model BIT, it also includes a provision excluding the possibility that a 
compulsory license could amount to expropriation so long as the license is in 
accordance with the TRIPS Agreement standards.214  This provision essentially 
incorporates the WTO standards into the BIT, which can prove to be problematic 
given the ambiguous nature of Article 31.215  Moreover, merely incorporating the 
standards from Article 31 will not provide any additional protection for 
investors.216  Under this framework, so long as a compulsory license is Article 31 
compliant, it will not violate the terms of the BIT.  A better idea would be to 
include a provision that specifically relates to when a compulsory license will be 
allowed and under what terms, allowing tribunals to focus on a more 
comprehensive set of factors for determining whether an indirect expropriation 
occurred.217   
Second, while the three-factor analysis of an indirect expropriation provides 
some guidance for tribunals, it pales in comparison to the detail provided for in 
                                                          
 
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an 
action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic 
value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect 
expropriation has occurred; 
 
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and 
 
(iii) the character of the government action. 
Id. at Annex B, para. 4. 
 
211 Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 
2005, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Uruguay.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-
Uruguay BIT].  
212 See Gibson, Compulsory License, supra note 208, at 396-97 (analyzing significant developments 
in the U.S.-Uruguay BIT, which incorporates the standards set forth in Article 31). 
213 See U.S.-Uruguay BIT supra, note 211. 
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license is TRIPS Agreement compliant, the expropriation provisions in…[the] U.S.-Uruguay BIT will 
not apply at all.”  Id. 
215 See supra Section IV (discussing the problems with the language and implementation of Article 
31bis). 
216 See Newcombe, supra note 97, at 41 (explaining that the addition of a factor-based analysis 
found in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement will not add anything new to the already existing body of 
international law). 
217 See id.  
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Article 31.218  Thus, inclusion of standards for what constitutes a national 
emergency, who makes those decisions, and analysis of a contracting state’s socio-
economic status would go a long way toward ensuring that patents are protected 
from unfounded and abusive compulsory licensing.219  Additionally, adequate 
remuneration standards in United States BITs should take into account the full 
“market value” of the investment, not just the “economic value” as required by 
Article 31 and many of the currently existing BITs.220  By considering the 
economic status of the country seeking a compulsory license, existence of 
legitimate need, as well as any offers to reduce purchase price, a tribunal will have 
a better chance of coming to a balanced decision on whether expropriation has 
occurred.221 
Lastly, to insure protection under BITs entered into by the United States, the 
treaties should be renegotiated to provide more detail and much needed guidance 
for investors on how the standard should be applied in a case against a government 
issuing a compulsory license.222  It has been observed that this lack of clear 
guidance on what regulatory actions amount to indirect expropriation can make 
arbitration under modern BITs regarding compulsory licenses particularly 
tricky.223  Regardless, given the potential to resolve disputes quickly and ensure 
protection, measures to increase the applicability of BIT’s should be seriously 
considered.  Indeed, it is surprising that the United States has entered into 
relatively few BITs compared to other countries.224 
While the use of BITs to protect against misuses of the compulsory licensing 
mechanism seems ideal, the high degree of deprivation needed to support a claim 
for indirect expropriation, as it is currently defined in many BITs, makes the 
possibility of fully protecting patent rights on this basis unrealistic.  
Pharmaceutical companies should place a renewed emphasis on urging the United 
States Trade Representative to renegotiate current BITs to specifically define 
parameters for indirect expropriation in the case of a compulsory license.   
                                                          
218 See Gibson, Compulsory License, supra note 208, at 400 n.158 (comparing the detailed 
provisions regarding use of a patent without the right-holder’s authorization, with the minimal advisory 
language offered in the U.S. Model BIT).   
219 See Feldman, supra note 162 (suggesting that a more comprehensive approach, including 
comparative analysis of income levels and medical programs, will be helpful when determining whether 
a country has objectively sufficient need for a compulsory license). 
220 See Gibson, Compulsory License, supra note 108, at 415 (explaining a scenario where a BIT 
requiring adequate remuneration that differs from the requirements of Article 31 (i.e. fair market value) 
could act as a form of “discipline” for the host state as it considers the amount of remuneration it will 
pay). 
 
222 See Newcombe, supra note 97, at 19 (explaining that “indirect expropriation” is the same as a 
“regulatory taking” in the expropriation context, and noting that a major problem with most investment 
treaties is that they “typically do not define the meaning of expropriation and often simply refer to 
government measures that are the ‘same’ or ‘equivalent’ to expropriation or are ‘tantamount to 
expropriation’”). 
223 See Gibson, Compulsory License, supra note 108, at 396 (explaining that the language found in 
most BITs present a difficult case for arbitration in the context of a claim for indirect expropriation 
from a pharmaceutical compulsory license because of the clash between opposing interests - namely the 
government’s interest in protecting public health and the patent holder’s interest to protect their 
investment). 
224 See id.  
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ii. Practical Guidance for Investors 
When considering whether a claim for indirect expropriation exists under a 
BIT, investors should undertake a two-part analysis.225  First, “the analysis should 
focus on the nature or magnitude of the interference to the investor’s property 
interest in the investment caused by measures attributable to the Host State to 
determine whether those actions amount to a taking.”226  Second, “there should be 
a determination of whether this taking or interference rises to the level of an 
expropriation by reference to the relevant treaty standard.”227  This analysis is 
similar to the factors set out in the United States Model BIT, which contains 
provisions about whether the economic impact of government action amounts to 
expropriation.228 
During the first stage of analysis, investors should realize that a compulsory 
license has the potential to undercut one of the fundamental incentives of an 
intellectual property investment – namely the right to exclusive patent usage within 
the foreign market.229  At worst, a compulsory license could substantially affect the 
ability of pharmaceutical producers to turn a profit, thus significantly reducing the 
value of the investment.  Thus, it has been observed that there is an obvious 
assumption the issuance of a compulsory license can “cause an adverse effect on 
the economic value of a patented product and interfere with the patent holder’s 
ability to use or enjoy its patent in a given market.”230  However, the extent of 
interference will be dependent upon the compulsory license’s terms, including the 
duration and length of the license, any subsequent remuneration to be paid to the 
investor owning the patent, and whether the parties authorized by the government 
to make use of the patent actually turn a profit from the license.231  A traditional 
analysis of a taking in the direct expropriation context requires that there be a 
“substantial deprivation” to the investor.232  However, any one of these factors 
alone will not always be determinative, but rather they should be weighed in the 
totality.  For example, if an investor is offered a low level of compensation under a 
compulsory license and the parties authorized by the government to use the 
compulsory license are in fact making a huge profit, there is a greater likelihood 
that a “taking” has occurred.233  By considering the practical effects of compulsory 
licensing, including a comprehensive valuation of the investment, international 
                                                          
225 Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 204, at 147-48. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 148. 
228 See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 209.  Under Annex B of the U.S. Model BIT, the determination 
of whether a measure constitutes an indirect expropriation requires consideration of three factors:  the 
economic impact of the government action; the extent to which the government action interferes with 
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and the character of the government action.  Id.  
229 Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 204, at 154. 
230 Michael Ewing-Chow, Thesis Antithesis and Synthesis: Investor Protection in BITs, WTO and 
FTAs, 30(2) U. NEW S. WHALES L.J. 548, 556 (2007).  Ewing-Chow proposes that the level of 
deprivation is predominantly a question of degree for investors in the indirect expropriation analysis.  
Id.  The answer to this question, he suggests, turns entirely on the duration, scope, and remuneration 
offered for any given patent use.  Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Lowenfeld, supra note 199, at 476. 
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arbitral tribunals confronted with an investor-state dispute should be well equipped 
to determine whether an indirect taking has occurred.234 
The second stage of analysis requires the investor to ask whether the taking 
is sufficient to constitute an indirect expropriation.  To determine if an indirect 
expropriation has occurred, international tribunals will consider (1) specific 
representations or actions regarding a promise of protection on the part of the 
foreign government, and (2) legitimate or reasonable expectations and reliance on 
the part of the investor.235  A situation in which both factors exist, presents a 
significantly different scenario from one in which no state representations or 
promises of protection are made to the investor directly.236  One such example of 
the former would be where some facially non-discriminatory legislation is passed, 
such as an increase in economic regulation, in which an investor may have no 
legitimate expectation of an unchanging government regulatory structure.237  
Without some additional representation of patent protection from the state, an 
investor would have a hard time arguing indirect expropriation under the BIT, and 
would have a better chance pursuing a claim through the WTO framework, 
challenging the issuance of the compulsory license directly instead of seeking a 
settlement award in arbitration.  This use of BIT arbitration is still evolving, but a 
careful analysis of the above factors, in conjunction with the possibility of future 
health crises, drug pricing and other market considerations, an investor should 
have a better chance of preserving her investment and saving money down the 
road. 
Before investing internationally, pharmaceutical companies should consider 
asking questions of a foreign government’s patent office about what kinds of 
protection they can expect, and inquire as to whether or not the granting of patent 
rights for a particular pharmaceutical qualifies as the type of representation or 
action toward the investor that will be recognized within the indirect expropriation 
context.  Investors should also consider whether it is reasonable for them to rely on 
the foreign government’s grant of patent protection throughout the term, especially 
if the pharmaceutical company anticipates any intermittent usage periods during 
the life of the patent.238  Additionally, investors should take care to observe what 
posture a country has taken toward other foreign investors in the past, and make 
decisions accordingly to fully protect their investments from expropriation. 
Lastly, investors should also consider the national patent law of a country in 
which they are considering an investment and inquire into whether there is a 
provision regulating compulsory licenses.  In most cases, these national laws will 
provide the terms under which a compulsory license may be granted by the 
                                                          
234 See Gibson, Compulsory License, supra note 208, at 385.  
235 See Newcombe, supra note 79, at 154 (explaining that a business’s legitimate expectation is 
determined, at least partially, by looking at any investment related treaties or agreements in existence at 
the time of investment.  Concern for this element is reflected in recent U.S. model investment treaty 
language by requiring arbitral tribunals to weigh the extent of governmental interference with patent 
rights, against the investor’s “distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations.”); see U.S. Model 
BIT, supra note 209. 
236 Newcombe, supra note 97, at 153. 
237 See Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 185 (discussing a tribunal’s finding that an investor had no 
reasonable expectation that the government regulatory policy would remain perpetually unchanged). 
238 Newcombe, supra note 97, at 153. 
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government.239  Thus, for an investor, reasonable investment-backed expectations 
should include the investor’s knowledge of the foreign state’s patent law system.  
With the increasing likelihood of a compulsory license being issued under the 
vague terms of Article 31, investors should consider whether a national patent law 
allowing increased relaxation of patent protection fundamentally undermines the 
stability of the patent such that complete reliance by the investor would be 
unreasonable.240   
Moreover, to the extent that a country’s national patent law, or government’s 
authorization of a compulsory license is inconsistent with international law, the 
patent owner, as a foreign investor, may also take into account that it is able to 
claim rights under international standards through either the WTO system or 
investment arbitration under a BIT.241  While there are many factors that can be 
used to determine whether indirect expropriation has occurred, these factors should 
provide an adequate framework for guiding tribunals when considering a 
government’s authorization of a compulsory license. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents takes on a particularly 
controversial nature.  On the one hand pharmaceutical companies are confronted 
by serious pressures to extend good will from countries faced with legitimate 
public health concerns, on the other are the reasonable investment-backed 
expectations of a patent-based investment rooted in an applicable BIT, national, or 
international patent laws such as the WTO.  With worldwide adoption of an 
increasingly expansive view of compulsory licensing in the name of public health, 
there are now good reasons for pharmaceutical companies who are considering 
investing abroad to explore the potential for dispute settlement either directly 
under a BIT or through WTO arbitration. 
The main issues regarding compulsory licenses are centered around the 
question of how much latitude governments should be given to take actions that 
may interfere with intellectual property investments, whether these actions erode 
the standards of protection established for investors under national patent laws and 
BITs, and whether such measures are consistent with the requirements set forth in 
                                                          
239 Id.  The limitations on patent usage, terms of protection and process for remuneration differs 
between countries.  Often times their overlapping language and procedures can be found in national 
patent laws, Article 31 and Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement, and applicable BITs.  Id. 
240 Lin, supra note 16, at 157 (emphasizing the common sense explanation that an investor in a state 
with a compulsory licensing statute should “be in a position to be able to foresee that the compulsory 
license is applicable and will have associated effects.”  Investors should “take [compulsory licensing 
laws] into consideration before making any investment decision[s].”); cf. Gibson, supra note 208 
(recognizing that in the majority of situations, compulsory licenses are only granted in exceptional 
circumstances, and positing that except in the case of a minority of countries, an investor should not 
reasonably expect that the existence of a compulsory licensing law will substantially undermine the 
investors “distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations”). 
241 Id.  An investor may opt for direct settlement under a BIT as a sole means for monetary recourse 
under a claim for indirect expropriation.  Id.  If the investor has reason to believe that the compulsory 
license was issued in violation of the Article 31 requirements, they may wish to pursue arbitration with 
the WTO, but will face additional challenges persuading their home country, as the WTO member state, 
to initiate the proceedings within the WTO framework.  Id. 
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Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.  Because the WTO framework serves as a 
baseline, the standards should be clear and comprehensive.  The realized benefits, 
in extreme circumstances, that compulsory licenses are meant to provide, are 
slowly becoming sidelined by a trend toward manipulating the vague language of 
TRIPS in order to compel licenses for any reason.  The language of TRIPS, 
specifically the amendment Article 31bis, needs to create consistent protection for 
foreign investors.  While Article 31bis is currently operational, a 2008 decision 
was made to extend the deadline for formally accepting the TRIPS agreement 
amendment.242  The deadline was extended until 31 December 2009 or “such later 
date as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference,” and has yet to be formally 
ratified.243  Any future amendments must incorporate strong IP protection, not just 
for its immediate effect, but also for establishing a long-term sustainable minimum 
baseline of protection for innovators. 
While the usage of BITs to protect foreign direct investment has the potential 
to be useful for pharmaceutical companies, the law is still evolving, and there is 
little in the way of precedent or guidance on successfully winning a case for 
indirect expropriation.  Pharmaceutical companies must recognize the continuing 
and unresolved conflict between the need for strong patent protection and the need 
to remedy future health emergencies.  Until the WTO’s Article 31 more 
appropriately addresses this balance, pharmaceutical companies will benefit by an 
increased focus on working with the United States Trade Representative to amend 
current BITs to provide increased guidance on when an indirect expropriation has 
occurred.  By designing BITs to specifically address indirect expropriation in the 
case of a compulsory license issued for pure economic gain, pharmaceutical 
companies investing abroad will have more confidence to innovate and continue 
foreign investment.  If enough BITs reflect this emphasis on increased intellectual 
property protection, the WTO might be influenced to make the much-needed 
changes to the lenient standards under Article 31. 
Until the WTO makes the necessary changes to its compulsory licensing 
laws, investors’ main goal for protecting their investment should be to utilize new, 
direct means of settlement in an effort to avoid WTO arbitration, or for the time 
being to reconsider investing in certain countries altogether. 
 
                                                          
242 Decision on Extension of Formal TRIPS Amendment (Dec. 18, 2007), http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/711.doc.  In order for the decision to have legal effect, 
two-thirds of the WTO’s 151 Members are required to ratify the agreement.  Id.  While the European 
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also Saez, supra note 40 (noting the struggle to achieve a consensus among WTO members regarding 
the format for evaluating the language and substance of the TRIPS amendment). 
243 Id. In 2008 the Ministerial Conference decided to extend the deadline for accepting the TRIPS 
agreement amendment to December 31, 2009 or “such later date as may be decided by the Ministerial 
Conference.”  Id. 
